Primates rely on visual attention to gather knowledge about their environment. The ability to recognize such knowledge-acquisition activity in another may demonstrate one aspect of Theory of Mind. Using a series of experiments in which chimpanzees were presented with a choice between an experimenter whose visual attention was available and another whose vision was occluded, we asked whether chimpanzees understood the relationship between visual attention and knowledge states. The animals showed sophisticated understanding of attention from the first presentation of each task. Under more complex experimental conditions, the subjects had more difficulty with species-typical processing of attentional cues and those likely to be learned during human contact. We discuss the results with respect to the comparative impact of enculturation on chimpanzees.
Whether the ability to discriminate one's own knowledge state from another's is uniquely human has been at the heart of a lively debate in comparative cognition (e.g. Povinelli & Eddy 1996a, b; Povinelli 2000; Tomasello 2000; Povinelli et al. 2002; Povinelli & Vonk 2003 , 2004 . However, research in the domain of nonhuman primates' understanding of the mind has not produced definitive conclusions about chimpanzees' ability to hold a Theory of Mind (Premack & Woodruff 1978; Povinelli & Eddy 1996a, b; Tomasello et al. 1999 Tomasello et al. , 2001 Tomasello et al. , 2003 Tomasello et al. , 2007 Hare et al. 2000 Hare et al. , 2001 Povinelli 2000) . Reports from Povinelli and colleagues, working with a group of seven adolescent chimpanzees at the New Iberia Primate Research Center, failed to demonstrate this capability (Povinelli & Eddy 1996a, b; Reaux et al. 1999; Povinelli 2000) . The New Iberia chimpanzees learned a stimulusbased rule to solve a preferential gesture task based on visual access to 'face' and 'eyes ' (Reaux et al. 1999 ). Thus, rather than showing global understanding of intentional aspects of attention, the animals learned to respond to what the investigators characterized as 'face' and 'eye' rules. Correct responses on these conditions could be generated using a perceptually bound rule such as, 'Gesture to person with face visible'. Interestingly, these chimpanzees never learned a comparable stimulus rule for eyes ('Gesture to person with eyes visible'). However, according to Povinelli and colleagues (Povinelli et al. 1999; Povinelli 2000) , the application of a perceptual mechanism based upon the visibility of the experimenter's face, rather than an understanding of the experimenter's intentional state or a mental representation of eyes as a means to acquire knowledge, best explained their chimpanzees' responses to the task.
New evidence suggests that chimpanzees' understanding of another chimpanzee's visual perspective (and hence, acquisition of knowledge) could be different from their own, and might govern subsequent behaviour (Tomasello et al. 2003) . In a series of innovative experiments, Hare et al. (2001) instigated food competition between dominant and subordinate chimpanzees. When both a dominant animal and a subordinate had visual access to food, the dominant chimpanzee successfully obtained the food reward. In subsequent conditions, when the food was visually available only to the subordinate animal, that chimpanzee was more likely to approach the food reward (Hare et al. 2001) . Given the hesitancy of subordinate animals to engage in direct competition with 
